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COMMENTS
EXTENT OF WASHINGTON CRIMINAL JURISDICTION
OVER INDIANS
ALLEN LANE CAER
STANLEY M. JOHANSON
The case of In re Andy,' a 1956 decision of the Washington Supreme
Court, demonstrated that there are approximately 15,000 persons in
the state of Washington who are not amenable to criminal prosecution
under state law in certain situations, and in many instances are not
amenable to either state or federal prosecution. These 15,000 persons2
are the Indians who live in our state but who reside in "Indian coun-
try" and have retained their status as wards of the federal government.
The problem of investigating and prosecuting crimes committed by
these Indians has confronted and frustrated both state and federal law
enforcement officers for over sixty years. It is a problem which was,
until 1953, shared by at least thirteen states where, as here, Indians
comprise a substantial portion of the population.
Reduced to its simplest terms, the problem is this: The state, which
has the investigatory and judicial system equipped to handle the prose-
cution of criminal offenses committed by Indians, cannot prosecute
in most instances, because the state has no jurisdiction over crimes
committed by Indians in Indian country. Several thousand square
miles of our state are within the boundaries of Indian country.,
Crimes by Indians on this land cannot be prosecuted in state courts.
As to such offenses, the federal courts have jurisdiction only over
those crimes listed in the "Ten Major Crimes Act."4 As to the remain-
1 49 Wn2d 449, 302 P.2d 963 (1956).
2 Estimated population of Indians in the State of Washington as of June 1, 1957(number of Indians on Indian rolls) :
Chehalis .................. 50 Nisqually ................ 62 Shoalwater ............ ..
Colville ......... 3,757 Ozette ................ Skokomish ............ 237
Hoh .............. 20 Port Gamble .......... 130 Spokane ......... 1,090
Lower Elwha ........ 85 Port Madison ........ 180 Squaxin Island ...... 29
Lummi .................... 830 Puyallup .................. 490 Swinomish ........ 348
M akah ................. 544 Quileute .................. 281 Tulalip .................... 765
Muckleshoot .......... 290 Quinault ................ 1,928 Yakima .................. 3,598
Figures obtained from Western Washington Indian Agency, United States Depart-
ment of Interior-Bureau of Indian Affairs, Everett, Washington.
: 2,800,000 acres of land are within the boundaries of Indian reservations in Wash-
ington. The Yakima reservation contains 1,100,000 acres, or 1,730 square miles. The
Colville reservation contains 1,360,000 acres, of which 1,100,000 acres are either tribal
or individual trust land, the balance being 260,000 acres of alienated land. Information
obtained from Western Washington Indian Agency, note 2 supra; Yakima Indian
Agency, Toppenish; Colville Indian Agency, Nespelem, Washington.
4 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (1952). The "Ten Major Crimes" are murder, manslaughter,
rape, incest, assault with intent to kill, assault with a dangerous weapon, arson,
burglary, robbery and larceny.
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ing offenses, an incredible list that includes such "lesser" crimes as
assault with intent to do great bodily injury, kidnapping, and statutory
rape, punishment is in theory left to the Indian tribes themselves; in
practice, there often is no punishment.
The serious nature of the problem can best be shown by the Andy
case. Joe Andy, a quarter-blood Indian, was convicted of burglary
in the Yakima County superior court on March 4, 1954. The offense
was committed on land which was within the boundaries of the
Yakima Indian Reservation but which had been patented in fee to a
non-Indian. Two years later, on April 6, 1956, Joe Andy petitioned
for and was granted a writ of habeas corpus on the ground that the
superior court had no jurisdiction to try the action. The court pointed
out that, by federal statute, the federal government has exclusive
jurisdiction over an unemancipated Indian who is alleged to have
committed a crime within Indian country. Ownership of the land by
a non-Indian did not affect the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal
government.
Joe Andy is today a free man. Federal authorities have not brought
action against him,' although the crime of burglary is one of the "ten
major crimes" and hence cognizable by federal courts. Since Joe
Andy's release from the state penitentiary, other Indians convicted
of crimes in state courts have been released from the penitentiary,
from the reformatory, and from county jails.6
Perhaps aroused by the decision handed down in the Andy case, the
Washington state legislature, at its 1957 session, enacted a statute7
which purports to come within the provision of a 1953 act of Con-
gress8 designed to transfer jurisdiction over any and all Indian crimes
to state courts. In passing this legislation, however, our legislature
apparently did not consider the implications of article 26, section 2,
of the state constitution, in which the people of the state expressly
disclaim jurisdiction over Indian lands. Further, the legislature did
not heed the mandate of the congressional act that the article of our
5 In deciding not to bring charges against Andy, the federal authorities probably
took into consideration the fact that Andy had served two years in the state peni-
tentiary.
6 Since the Andy case, twelve Indians have been released from the Washington State
Reformatory at Monroe, and one Indian has been released from the State Penitentiary
at Walla Walla. Letter from Stephen C. Way, Assistant Attorney General, to the
writers, June 26, 1958. No information concerning releases from county jails has been
obtained.
7 WAS1. SEss. LAws 1957, c. 240; now codified in R.C.W. 37.12.010.070.
867 STAT. 588 (1953), 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (Supp. 1958), 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (Supp.
1958).
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constitution be amended before jurisdiction over Indian lands could
be acquired. The probable outcome will be that the Washington
statute will be declared unconstitutional when first tested. Instead
of resolving the jurisdictional problems over Indian crimes, the legis-
lature seems to have created a host of new problems.
THE TEN MAJOR CRnms ACT
The problem of jurisdiction over Indian crimes first received nation-
wide attention in 1883, when the United States Supreme Court handed
down its decision in the landmark case of Ex parte Crowdog.' In that
case Crowdog, a member of the Choctaw tribe, had bludgeoned to
death one of his fellow tribesmen with a hunting knife. The federal
government attempted to prosecute, but a conviction of first degree
murder was reversed by the Supreme Court, because there was no
statute giving federal courts jurisdiction over crimes committed by
Indians on reservations. It had previously been held by the Supreme
Court that state courts had no jurisdiction to prosecute crimes com-
mitted by Indians on reservations. Thus, Crowdog could not be prose-
cuted, although he had admittedly committed a most heinous crime,
because no court was competent to try him. The decision raised such
a storm of protest"0 that in 1885 Congress passed a statute giving
federal courts jurisdiction to try Indians for the crimes of murder,
manslaughter, rape, assault with intent to kill, arson, burglary, and
larceny. The statute was known as the "Seven Major Crimes Act.""
This list of crimes has grown by congressional legislation as different
crimes were committed for which, to the dismay of the public, no
prosecution was possible. By 1932, the list of crimes had grown to
ten. It has not been added to since that time. The ten major crimes
are murder, manslaughter, assault with intent to kill, assault with a
dangerous weapon, burglary, robbery, larceny, arson, rape, and
incest."
As a result of this federal legislation, criminal jurisdictior over
Indians has been shared in the following manner:" As to offenses
committed by Indians outside the bounds of Indian country, state
courts may exercise jurisdiction just as they may as to crimes com-
mitted by non-Indians. As to crimes committed by Indians within
0 109 U.S. 556 (1883).
10 For a more extensive discussion of the background of this legislation, see COHEN,
HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAw 146-147 (3rd ed. 1942).
11 23 STAT. 362, 385 (1885).
1"18 U.S.C. § 1153 (1952 ed.).
13 See COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 358-365 (3rd ed. 1942).
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Indian country, federal courts are to have jurisdiction over the crimes
listed in the Ten Major Crimes Act. All other crimes are, in theory,
to be handled by the individual tribes.
Problems resulting from this three-way split of jurisdiction over
Indian offenses are readily apparent. In the first place, the list of
"lesser" crimes not within the Ten Major Crimes Act is a bit startling.
One writer has compiled the following list:'"
(1) Assault cases that do not involve a "dangerous weapon" or
where "intent to kill" cannot be proved, no matter how brutal the
attack may be or how near death the victim is placed. The offenses
of assault with intent to commit rape and assault with intent to do
great bodily injury, if committed by an Indian within Indian country,
are exempt from prosecution in both federal and state courts.
(2) Sex offenses other than rape and incest. This would include
adultery, bigamy, sodomy, and seduction.
(3) Various crimes such as kidnapping, receiving stolen goods,
poisoning (if the victim does not die), embezzlement, blackmail, libel,
forgery, fraud, mayhem, bribery, carrying concealed weapons, dis-
orderly conduct, and offenses against public health.
To this list, traffic offenses on major highways traveling through
Indian reservations might be added, because, by statute, these high-
ways remain part of "Indian country.""
The Indian tribes have authority to handle these offenses in tribal
courts. But the severity of such crimes alone indicates that such
courts, if they existed, could not adequately dispose of these problems.
In actual practice, the Indian tribal court system is inadequate. A
recent study disclosed that, of the twenty-one tribes in Washington,
only five are considered to have tribal court systems capable of han-
dling even the minor crimes.'" Many tribes have no court systems
at all. Leaving prosecution of crimes to the Indians often means that
there is no prosecution at all.
Een where an adequate tribal court system does exist, there is
much to be desired. Under the most comprehensive Indian tribal
codes, only forty to sixty offenses are considered, as compared to the
more than 2,000 offenses covered by the Washington penal code. The
punishment meted out is archaic and too humane, and often does not
14 Id. at 147.
"1 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (1952).16 Report by Richard F. Broz, Office of the Attorney General, for State Attorney
General Don Eastvold, October 20, 1954: "Legal Problems Concerning Indians and
Their Rights Under Federal and State Laws." (Unpublished Manuscript.)
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fit the crime.17 Several generations ago, separate legal consideration
of Indian offenses was perhaps necessary, because the Indian culture
was distinct from the white man's culture. But this is no longer true.
To a very great extent, especially in Washington, the Indian, even
where he has retained his status as a ward of the federal government,
has developed a culture in most respects like that of the other citizens
of the state. This has come about through associating, working, and
attending school with the white man. It only remains to make him
amenable to the same legal system.
The first major defect of the Ten Major Crimes Act, then, is that
it leaves many offenses, often of the most serious nature, to inadequate
or nonexistent tribal courts. A second major defect is that it leaves
many matters to federal law enforcement officers, who are not in the
best position to handle them. Consider, for example, the crime of
larceny. The Ten Major Crimes Act vests jursidiction over this
offense in the federal courts. The crime of larceny includes offenses
of a serious nature; it also includes petty larcenies which could best
be handled by local authorities or perhaps by the Indians themselves.
But, as we have seen, the state is powerless to act. Moreover, the act
was probably intended to vest exclusive jurisdiction over the enumer-
ated crimes in the federal courts, thereby precluding the Indian courts
from taking action on the matter."8 Realistically, the federal authori-
ties are not concerned with, and should not be burdened with, trivial
offenses of a purely local character.
In practice, the federal authorities do not concern themselves with
the minor offenses, though listed under the act. A crime will not be
investigated unless called to the attention of federal authorities by
the Indian agent on the reservation. If he decides not to report the
offense, it will not be brought to the attention of these authorities.
Even if he does report it, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the
17 Cohen, op. cit. supra at 147, notes these differences between Indian tribal codes
and state penal codes:
1. The number of offenses specified in a tribal code generally runs between
40 and 50, whereas a state code (exclusive of local municipal ordinances)
generally specifies between 800 and 2,000 offenses.
2. The maximum punishment specified in the Indian penal codes is generally
more humane, seldom exceeding imprisonment for six months, even for
offenses like kidnapping, for which state penal codes impose imprisonment
for 20 years or more, or death.
3. Except for fixing a maximum penalty, the Indian penal codes leave a large
discretion to the court in adjusting the penalty to the circumstances of the
offense and the offender.
4. The form of punishment is typically forced labor for the benefit of the tribe
or of the victim of the offense, rather than imprisonment.
Is See Cohen, op. cit. supra at 147.
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authorized government investigating agency, may not wish to investi-
gate or may be unable to do so because of an inadequate staff. In a
conversation with the writers, an agent of the Seattle office of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation commented that the Ten Major
Crimes Act in effect requires that the F.B.I. do local police work.
He pointed out that the F.B.I. was not organized for such purposes
and is not equipped to handle such matters."
If the Bureau does investigate the offense, the local federal attorney
may not wish to prosecute or may be unable to do so for the same
reasons. In three places, then, discretionary decisions can be made
as to whether a case should be brought to trial. As a result, many
lesser offenses go unpunished. Were these same offenses brought to
the attention of the local prosecuting attorney, more concerned as he
is with local law enforcement problems, there would be a greater num-
ber of prosecutions.
CoNGRESSIONAL ACT OF 1953
Agitation for a change in the law resulted, in 1953, in the passage
of an act of Congress"0 that would ultimately give jurisdiction over
Indian offenses to all the states that have Indian lands within their
limits. This would remedy the problems created by the Ten Major
Crimes Act. No longer would there be an unworkable split of juris-
diction among state courts, federal courts, and Indian tribes. Instead,
the Indian would be treated as any other resident of the state and
would be amenable to prosecution in local courts.
Under the 1953 Act, states were treated in three separate ways. As
to five states, where there existed no constitutional or other impedi-
ments to the states' exercise of jurisdiction over Indians except the
Ten Major Crimes, Act, the statute expressly transferred jurisdiction
to the state.2' In these five states Indians are now being prosecuted
in state courts.
As to a second group of states, where authorities had indicated an
unwillingness to accept jurisdiction, the act left the door open for
19 Another problem which the F.B.I. faces arises when their investigation discloses
that the criminal offense does not, or may not, fall within the enumerated "Ten Major
Crimes." One unreported case involved an alleged rape of a 14-year-old girl. In-
vestigation disclosed strong evidence of assault with attempt to commit rape but little
or no evidence which would support a conviction of rape. The case was dropped, as
assault with attempt to commit rape is not one of the "Ten Major Crimes."
20 67 STAT. 588 (1953), 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (Supp. 1958), 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (Supp.
1958).
21 18 U.S.C. § 1162(a) (Supp. 1958). The five states listed in the statute are Cali-
fornia, Minnesota, Nebraska, Oregon, and Wisconsin.
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such states to acquire jurisdiction in the future, when they wished
to do so."
As to a third group of eight states, including Washington," the act
gave the consent of the United States to acquisition of jurisdiction by
the states, provided that the states first amend their constitution. 4
The enabling acts of these states, and consequently their state consti-
tutions, contain express disclaimers of jurisdiction over Indian lands.
As to these states, the effect of the 1953 act was to retain the exclu-
sive federal jurisdiction over Indian lands, but it gave those states the
power to acquire jurisdiction by amending their constitution or statutes
so as to remove any legal impediments to the exercise of jurisdiction.
At its 1957 session, the Washington legislature enacted a statute,25
hereinafter called chapter 240, which purported to come within the
congressional act. No reference was made to the Washington con-
stitutional provision expressly disclaiming jurisdiction over Indian
lands.
THE WASHINGTON CONSTITUTION
Article 26 section 2 of the Washington constitution reads as follows:
... second; That the people inhabiting this state do agree and declare
that they forever disclaim all right and title to the unappropriated
public lands lying within the boundaries of this state, and to all lands
lying within said limits owned or held by any Indian or Indian Tribes;
and that until the title thereto shall have been extinguished by the dis-
22 67 STAT. 588, 590 (1953). This section of the statute is not codified, but is referred
to in a note following 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (Supp. 1958). The Senate and House reports
indicate that this portion of the statute refers to the state of Nevada. 2 U.S. CODE
CONGRESSIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE NEWS, 83rd Cong., 1st Sess. 2409, 2412 (1953).
23 The statute does not explicitly name the state to which this section of the statute
refers. The effect of this statute, and the states to which it applies, are discussed in
the House and Senate reports. 2 U.S. CODE CONGRESSIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE
NEWS, 83rd Cong., 1st Sess. 2414 (1953).
It appears that there are legal impediments to the transfer of jurisdiction over
Indians on their reservations in the case of a number of States. An examination
of the Federal statutes and State constitutions indicates that enabling acts for
the following States, and in consequence the constitutions of these States, contain
express disclaimers of jurisdiction. These States are Arizona, Montana, New
Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Utah, and Washington.
[Emphasis supplied.] In these cases the enabling acts required the people of
the proposed States expressly to disclaim jurisdiction over Indian land and
that, until the Indian title was extinguished, the lands were to remain under the
absolute jurisdiction and control of the Congress of the United States. In each
instance the State constitution contains an appropriate disclaimer. It would
appear in each case, therefore, that the Congress would be required to give its
consent and the people of each state would be required to amend the State con-
stitution before the State could legally assume jursidiction.
2467 STAT. 588, 590 (1953). This section of the statute is not codified, but is
referred to in a note following 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (Supp. 1958).
25 WASH. SESs. LAws 1957, c. 240; now codified in R.C.W. 37.12.
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position of the United States, the said Indian lands shall remain under
the absolute jurisdiction and control of the Congress of the United
States. (Emphasis supplied.)
A fair interpretation of this provision is that the state disclaims
jurisdiction over Indian land except where ownership of the land
has passed either to the state or to a non-Indian. It would seem that
the disclaimer would be inoperative in cases such as the Andy case,
supra, where the land had been patented in fee to a non-Indian. But
where the land is owned by the Indians or the Indian tribes or is held
in trust for them by the United States, the disclaimer would be effec-
tive.
The 1953 act of Congress did not, of course, extinguish title to
Indian lands. The act left title to Indian lands exactly where it was-
with the Indians and/or the United States. The only effect of the
act was to give jurisdiction over Indian offenses to some states and to
allow assumption of jurisdiction by other states, including Wash-
ington. In view of this, it would seem that the end result of the legis-
lature's failure to consider the Washington constitution in passing
chapter 240 will be to bring greater confusion to an area of law
enforcement already beset with serious practical problems.
As to lands owned by Indians and/or the United States, the con-
stitutional disclaimer should still apply to prevent the state's exercise
of jurisdiction over Indian offenses alleged to have been committed
on such lands-notwithstanding chapter 240. As to land now owned
by the state or a non-Indian, it is arguable that the constitutional dis-
claimer does not bar assumption of jurisdiction by the state. But the
legislature, inasmuch as it disregarded the Washington constitution
entirely, did not differentiate on the basis of ownership of lands. What
will the Washington court do when the statute is tested?
The court could declare the statute constitutional in part and
unconstitutional in part. The court might rule that the state can
exercise jurisdiction over land now owned by the state or by non-
Indians but not over lands owned by Indians or the United States.
Alternatively, the court might strike down the entire statute. The
latter course would probably be the most desirable, to avoid any
further compounding of confusion over jurisdiction problems.
It might be argued with some force that article 26, section 2, of the
constitution does not bar the state from exercising jurisdiction over
offenses committed by Indians on Indian or federally owned lands.
This argument would be supported by a number of Washington cases
[AUTUMN
JURISDICTION OVER INDIANS
which have held that non-Indians who commit offenses on Indian
lands are amenable to state criminal prosecution,26 and by a number
of cases which have gone so far as to hold that non-enrolled Indians
(those who have given up their status as wards of the federal gov-
ernment) are amenable to state criminal prosecution." It will be
observed that the disclaimer clause in the constitution makes no dis-
tinction between Indians and non-Indians; on its face it appears to
be an absolute disclaimer of jurisdiction over all Indian lands.
Arguendo, if the Washington Supreme Court has permitted prosecu-
tion of non-Indians and emancipated Indians in spite of this consti-
tutional provision, why cannot non-emancipated Indians likewise be
prosecuted? Before this question is answered, it is appropriate to
ask another question: In view of the constitutional disclaimer, on
what grounds has the court permitted the prosecution of non-Indians
and emancipated Indians?
Surprisingly, the cases do not give an answer to this question. In
the host of cases in which the Washington court has permitted prose-
cution of an offense committed on Indian lands, in only one case has
the constitutional question been raised by counsel. And the answer
given by the court in that case was so unsatisfactory that it seems
remarkable that the question has not been relitigated.
The only Washington case the writers have found which specific-
ally considered the constitutional question was State v. Lindsey,2
decided in 1925. The court, in holding that the constitution did not
bar prosecution by the state, did not give any reason for its holding,
but simply cited three Washington cases2' and a United States Supreme
Court case" which it felt were controlling.
However, the state cases cited did not consider the constitutional
question. In each of the three cases, the issue raised before the court
was whether there was a federal disability which precluded the state
from exercising jurisdiction. Obviously there was not; the Ten Major
Crimes Act and antecedent legislation, giving federal courts exclusive
jurisdiction, applied only to crimes committed by Indians. Crimes
committed by non-Indians or emancipated Indians are not within
the Major Crimes Act legislation, regardless of the locus of the crime.
'" State v. Lindsey, 133 Wash. 140, 233 Pac. 327 (1925).
27 State v. Williams, 13 Wash. 335, 43 Pac. 15 (1895) ; State v. Howard, 33 Wash.
250, 74 Pac. 382 (1903) ; State v. Smokalem, 37 Wash. 91, 79 Pac. 603 (1905).
- 133 Wash. 140, 233 Pac. 327 (1925).
20 State v. Williams, 13 Wash. 335, 43 Pac. 15 (1895) ; State v. Howard, 33 Wash.
250, 74 Pac. 382 (1903) ; State v. Smokalem, 37 Wash. 91, 79 Pac. 603 (1905).
20 Draper v. United States, 164 U.S. 240 (1896).
1958]
IVASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
In all three of these earlier Washington decisions the court affirmed
convictions on this ground alone.
The court, in the Lindsey case, felt that the case of Draper v. United
States" was controlling upon the question. The court reasoned as
follows: The Draper case had considered the Enabling Act of 1886,
which act is for all purposes the same as what is now article 26, sec-
tion 2, of the constitution, in connection with a Montana case.- In
the Draper case the Supreme Court held (1) that the federal courts
did not have jurisdiction over crimes committed by non-Indians on
Indian lands and (2) that the Enabling Act could not deprive the
state courts of jurisdiction, because to do so would give less than
equal footing to Montana in becoming a state, in violation of the
United States Constitution.
The Washington court then said that this meant that article 26,
section 2, of the state constitution does not prevent the state from
taking jurisdiction over such crimes, since the wording of the consti-
tutional provision is identical with the wording of the Enabling Act.
The Washington court was correct in its interpretation of the Draper
case. That case held that the United States did not have jurisdiction
and that the Enabling Act did not prevent the state from having it.
But the Washington court was mistaken in holding that the Draper
case was controlling on the constitutional question. At the time of the
Draper case, 1896, this prohibition of the Enabling Act was part of
the Montana constitution. The court in the Draper case did not con-
sider whether such a prohibition in the state constitution would deprive
the state of jurisdiction but held only that the Enabling Act did not
do so. The Draper case may be good law for the proposition that the
United States has no jurisdiction over crimes committed by non-
Indians on Indian reservations; but it is not good law for the proposi-
tion that the state constitution adopted by the people of Montana has
not precluded the state from exercising such jurisdiction. Nor is it
good law for the proposition that article 26, section 2, of the Wash-
ington constitution has not done so.
There have been hundreds of prosecutions in the state of Wash-
ington in which the criminal offense has been committed on Indian
lands, as that term is envisaged by the state constitution. It seems
31 Ibid.
32 The Enabling Act, 25 STAT. 676 (1886), applied to the states of Washington,
Montana, North Dakota, and South Dakota. All four of these states were admitted
into the United States at the same time. All four states incorporated into their state
constitutions the language of the Enabling Act relating to jurisdiction over Indian
lands.
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almost disrespectful to suggest that these prosecutions, and subse-
quent convictions, were unconstitutional. Still, it is interesting to
speculate as to what would be the outcome if the constitutional ques-
tion were relitigated today.
So far as the present article is concerned, however, the question
before us in whether the Lindsey holding should be extended to cover
prosecution of Indians who commit offenses on Indian lands. The
answer would seem to be no.33 To take the final step and hold that,
as a result of the legislation passed in 1957, the state can now prose-
cute enrolled Indians, would emasculate article 26, section 2 com-
pletely.
However troublesome this clause of the constitution may be, it is
still part of our constitution. As stated in the preamble to article 26:
"The following ordinance shall be irrevocable without the consent
of the United States and the people of this state." (Emphasis supplied.)
Constitutional amendment is the province of the people, not of the
legislature or the courts. While there are compelling reasons for
sustaining the Lindsey holding as applied to non-Indians and emanci-
pated Indians," there seems to be no justification for extending that
holding to the present situation-unless the court finds justification
in saving the legislature from an embarrassing situation.
NON-COMP ANCE WITH MANDATE OF CONGRESSiONAI ACT
There is a further reason why chapter 240, passed by our legisla-
ture in 1957, may be declared invalid. As discussed above," the 1953
act of Congress gave special treatment to states such as Washington
having constitutional disclaimers of jurisdiction over Indian lands.
As to such states, the statute did not expressly transfer jurisdiction
over Indian lands to state courts. Rather, the statute provided that
those states could acquire jurisdicion by amending their constitu-
33 In State v. Lohnes, - N.Dak. - , 69 N.W.2d 508 (1955), the supreme court
of North Dakota held that a federal statute purporting to transfer jurisdiction over
the criminal offenses of one Indian tribe to North Dakota courts was not effective to
do so. The state could not exercise jurisdiction until the state constitution was
amended by the people of the state. The court's opinion contains an able discussion of
the original purpose of the "absolute disclaimer of jurisdiction" clause in North
Dakota's constitution. The issue before the North Dakota court is identical with the
issue that would face the Washington court if chapter 240 were challenged on consti-
tutional grounds. See note 34 supra.
34 Perhaps the most compelling reason is that, if the court were to hold otherwise,
upwards of five per cent of the persons now in state penal institutions and county jails
would have to be released. Much of the state, including several towns, is within the
boundaries of Indian country (note 3 supra), and an estimate that one out of twenty
convictions involved a crime committed on an Indian reservation is probably a con-
servative estimate.
35 Note 23, supra.
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tions."6 Correctly or incorrectly, Congress decided that these consti-
tutional provisions must be amended before the states could acquire
jurisdiction. Acquisition of jurisdiction over Indians is conditional
upon the state's amending its constitution. Until it does so, it has not
come within the federal government's consent.
DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY
In addition to the constitutional questions raised by chapter 240,
the statute raises other problems, legal and practical. Chapter 240
does not attempt directly to acquire jurisdiction over Indians. In
effect, it permits the Indians of each tribe to determine for themselves
whether they should transfer jurisdiction to the state. Section 2 of
chapter 240 reads as follows:
Whenever the governor of this state shall receive from the tribal coun-
cil or other governing body of any Indian tribe, community, band, or
group in this state a resolution expressing its desire that its people and
lands be subject to the criminal and civil jurisdiction of the state of
Washington to the extent authorized by federal law, he shall issue
within 60 days a proclamation to the effect that [the state shall have
jurisdiction].
Section 3 of the act goes on to state that, after sixty days from the
issuance of such proclamation, the state shall assume jurisdiction over
Indian offenses and state criminal laws shall apply.
Has the legislature made an unconstitutional delegation of legis-
lative authority to the Indians? Under the state constitution the leg-
islature cannot delegate its power to make laws to another group or
agency. As construed by our supreme court, this does not prevent the
legislature from allowing some other group to either fill in the details
of legislation properly enacted by the legislature, or to allow a deter-
mination of when an act shall go into effect as indicated by the vote
of a local group."
-3 67 STAT. 588, 590 (1953)
SEC. 6. Notwithstanding the provisions of any Enabling Act for the admission
of a State, the consent of the United States is hereby given to the people of any
State to amend, where necessary, their State constitution or existing statutes, as
the case may be, to remove any legal impediment to the assumption of civil and
criminal jurisdiction in accordance with the provisions of this Act: Provided,
That the provisions of this Act shall not become effective with respect to such
assumption of jurisdiction by any such State until the people thereof have appro-
priately amended their State constitution or statutes as the case may be.
This section of the statute is not codified, but is referred to in a note following 28
U.S.C. § 1360 (Supp. 1958).
37 Washington law and cases concerning delegation of legislative authority are dis-
cussed in Trautman, Administrative Law Problems of Delegation and Implementation
in Washington, 33 VAsH. L. REv. 33 at 38-45 (1958).
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JURISDICTION OVER INDIANS
It is within this last possibility that chapter 240 must come if it is
to be sustained as a proper delegation of legislative power. The situa-
tion is somewhat analogous to problems over local option laws. As
described by a leading writer, these laws leave to the vote of the
people of a locality the determination of when, or whether, a law shall
be applicable to them." Early cases often struck down such laws as
being unconstitutional delegations of legislative authority, but mod-
ernly they have been upheld."0 A number of Washington cases have
sustained matters left to the vote of local groups.40 In all such cases,
however, a purely local problem was involved, such as whether a
water district should be reboundaried or a sewer district formed.
None of the cases has left to the voters of a particular locality or
group such a basic matter of law as is here involved. As stated in an
early Massachusetts case4' involving an act which purported to allow
each county in the state to decide for itself the question of woman's
suffrance, it would seem that where the problem is one of vital con-
cern to the state as a whole, and not simply local in scope, the matter
must be handled by the legislature alone and cannot be delegated.
The problem of jurisdiction over Indian crimes could be so categorized.
PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS
Aside from the legal questions raised by permitting the Indians of
each tribe to determine whether their tribe and lands shall come under
state jurisdiction, the statute raises practical questions of serious
import. At the time of publication of this comment, eight of the state's
twenty-one tribes have elected to come under the criminal jurisdic-
tion of the state, and have delivered a resolution to the governor in
accordance with chapter 240.42 Until the remaining tribes choose to
come under the state's jurisdiction, if they choose to do so, the result
will be the same piecemeal exercise of jurisdiction which presently
exists. The sad fact is that, unless all twenty-one tribes agree to come
under the state's jurisdiction, chapter 240 will have only gone part
way toward the solution of the problem. For example, the eight tribes
-8 Jaffe, Law Making by Private Groups, 51 HARv. L. REv. 201 (1937).
3 Id. at 224.
40 State v. Storey, 51 Wash. 630, 99 Pac. 878 (1909) ; Spokane v. Camp, 50 Wash.
554, 97 Pac. 770 (1908) ; Royer v. Public Utility District No. 1, 186 Wash. 142, 56
P.2d 1302 (1936).
41 In re Municipal Suffrage to Women, 160 Mass. 586, 36 N.E. 488 (1894).
4- The eight tribes are as follows: Skokomish, Muckleshoot, Quileute, Chehalis,
Nisqually, Tulalip, Suquamish, and Quinault. Letter from Warren A. Bishop, Assist-
ant to the Governor, to the writers, June 3, 1958.
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which have consented to the state's jurisdiction account for only 3,600
of the state's 14,000 enrolled Indians.
Chapter 240 allows the Indians to bring their tribes and lands under
state jurisdiction by vote or resolution of the Indians themselves. But
of what effect is this where more than one tribe live on a reservation,
with no well-defined boundaries separating them? And where there
is only one tribe on a reservation and it has voted to give jurisdiction
to the state, does this bind an Indian visiting from another tribe not
under the state's jurisdiction? Chapter 240 purports to allow the
"tribe and lands" to be brought under the jurisdiction of the state.
However, because this land is not a unique subdivision, such as a city
or county, it seems questionable whether one tribe could bind a
member of another tribe simply because he happens to be on that
land, the terms of the act notwithstanding. Obviously, the possibilities
for conflict open to a fertile mind are unlimited, and the opportunities
for confusion unbridled.
CONCLUSION
It is difficult to perceive why a more direct approach to the problem
of Indian crimes was not taken. The present approach is fraught with
legal and practical problems which may require years of litigation
to settle. As eight tribes have already been brought within the state's
purported jurisdiction, it appears that this litigation will not be long
in coming, with the probable result being that chapter 240 will be
declared unconstitutional. And even if not, there is the grim possi-
bility that the state's jurisdiction will apply to only a portion of the
Indians in our state. The legislature's failure to consider the Wash-
ington constitution in passing chapter 240 was short-sighted; its deci-
sion to let the Indians decide for themselves whether they should come
under the jurisdiction of the state was ill-considered.
The state should take positive action along the lines discussed before
more of the tribes are brought within the purported jurisdiction of the
state. Congress has offered the means available. The state constitu-
tion should be amended. New legislation should then be passed assum-
ing jurisdiction over all of the Indians within the state. In this manner,
the litigation will be limited to that ordinarily arising in any criminal
case. If this remedial action is begun now, the state may be able to
avoid the litigation which is otherwise certain to arise.
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